Intuitively, a task is local if the output value of each process depends only on the process' own input value, not on the input values of the other processes; a task is non-local otherwise.
Introduction
In this paper, we investigate the following question: What is the minimum information about failures that is necessary to solve any non-local task in message-passing systems?
To understand this question, we must first explain what we mean here by "non-local task". Roughly speaking, an (input/output) task is a relation between the input and the output values of processes [2, 14, 16] . In this paper, we consider one-shot tasks where each process has a single input value drawn from a finite number of possible input values, and each process outputs a single value. To classify a task as being local or non-local, we consider its input/output requirement in simple systems with no failures. Intuitively, a task is local if, in systems with no failures, every process can compute its output value locally by applying some function on its own input value. A task is non-local if it is not local.
To illustrate the concept of task locality, consider the trivial "identity" task which requires that every process simply outputs a copy of its input. Intuitively, this task is local: every process can compute its output locally, without any message exchange. Now consider the binary consensus task. This task is not local, in the sense that at least one process cannot compute its output from its individual input only (this holds even in a system where all processes are correct). So consensus is a non-local task.
To determine the minimum information about failures that is necessary to solve non-local tasks, we use the abstraction of failure detectors [4] . Failure detectors have been used to solve several basic problems of 1
paper. Henceforth, we assume the existence of a discrete global clock; the range of this clock's ticks is N. 2.1 Asynchronous message-passing systems. We consider distributed message-passing systems with a set of n ≥ 2 processes Π = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Processes execute steps asynchronously and they communicate with each other by sending messages through reliable but asynchronous communication links. Each process has access to a failure detector module that provides some information about failures, as explained below.
2.2 Failures, failure patterns and environments. Processes are subject to crash failures, i.e., they may stop taking steps. A failure pattern is a function F : N → 2 Π , where F (t) is the set of processes that have crashed through time t. Processes never recover from crashes, and so F (t) ⊆ F (t + 1). Let faulty(F ) = t∈N F (t) be the set of faulty processes in a failure pattern F ; and correct(F ) = Π − faulty(F ) be the set of correct processes in F . When the failure pattern F is clear from the context, we say that process p is correct if p ∈ correct(F ), and p is faulty if p ∈ faulty(F ). The failure-free failure pattern, i.e., the pattern where all the processes are correct, is denoted F f f .
An environment E is a non-empty set of failure patterns. Intuitively, an environment describes the number and timing of failures that can occur in the system. We denote by E * the set of all failure patterns. Intuitively, in a system with environment E * each process may crash, and it may do so any time.
2.3 Failure detectors. Each time a process queries its failure detector module, the response that it gets is a finite binary string from {0, 1} * . A failure detector history describes the behavior of a failure detector during an execution. Formally, it is a function H : Π × N → {0, 1} * , where H(p, t) is the value output by the failure detector module of process p at time t.
A failure detector D is a function that maps every failure pattern F to a nonempty set of failure detector histories. D(F ) is the set of all possible failure detector histories that may be output by D when the failure pattern is F . Typically we specify a failure detector by stating the properties that its histories satisfy. The trivial failure detector D ⊥ always outputs ⊥ at all processes, forever: ∀F ∈ E * , ∀p ∈ Π, ∀t ∈ N, , ∀H ∈ D(F ) : H(p, t) = ⊥.
Message buffer.
A message buffer, denoted M , contains all the messages that were sent but not yet received. When a process p attempts to receive a message, it either receives a message m ∈ M addressed to p or the "empty" message ⊥.
hal-00401844, version 1 -6 Jul 2009 2.5 Input/Output variables. To model input/output tasks, we assume that each process p can read an input variable, denoted IN (p), and write an output variable, denoted OUT (p); both variables are external to p. We assume that IN (p) is initialized to some input value in {0, 1} * , and that IN (p) does not change after its initialization. Moreover, we assume that OUT (p) is initialized to the special value ⊥ ∈ {0, 1} * (to denote that it was not yet written by p).
2.6 Algorithms. An algorithm A consists of n deterministic automata, one for each process; the automaton for process p is denoted A(p). The execution of an algorithm A proceeds as a sequence of process steps. In a step, a process p performs the following actions atomically: (1) receive a single message m from the message buffer M , or the empty message ⊥; (2) read its input variable IN (p); (3) query its local failure detector module and receive some value d; (4) change its state; (5) may write a value in its output variable OUT (p); and (6) may send messages to other processes.
2.7 Runs of an algorithm. A run of algorithm A using failure detector D in environment E is a tuple R = (F, H, I , S, T ) where F is a failure pattern in E, H is a failure detector history in D(F ), I is an initial input (I (p) is the initial value of the input variable IN (p), for each p), S is a sequence of steps of A, and T is a list of times in N (T [i] is the time when step S[i] is taken) such that F , H, I , S, T satisfy some standard validity conditions. Specifying the above conditions formally is straightforward (e.g., see [3] ) but tedious. Since this formalization is not necessary to present our results, we omit it from this extended abstract.
Since we focus on algorithms that solve one-shot input/output tasks, we restrict our attention to algorithms where each process writes its output variable at most once. That is, henceforth we consider only algorithms A that satisfy the following condition: For any failure detector D, any environment E, and any run R of A using D in E, every process p writes OUT (p) at most once.
2.8 The input/output of a run. Let R = (F, H, I , S, T ) be a run of an algorithm A (using some failure detector D in an environment E). The processes' input/output behavior in run R is defined as follows. The input of run R is I ; recall that for each process p ∈ Π, I (p) is the initial value of the input variable IN (p) in R. The output of run R, denoted O, is the vector of values written by processes in run R; more precisely, for each process p ∈ Π, O(p) is the value that p writes in its variable OUT (p) in R, and O(p) = ⊥ if p never writes OUT (p) in run R. It is also convenient to say that F is the failure pattern of run R.
2.9 Input/output tasks. We consider one-shot input/output tasks, i.e., problems where each process has an input value and writes an output value. To specify a task, we must give the set of possible input values, the set of possible output values, and the input/output behaviors that satisfy the task. For any task T , each process p has a non-empty set I p of possible input values, and a set O p of possible output values that contains the special value ⊥ (intuitively, ⊥ denotes an empty output). Henceforth, I = I 1 × I 2 × · · · × I n and O = O 1 × O 2 × · · · × O n ; moreover, I ∈ I and O ∈ O denote vectors of input and output values, respectively: one value for each of the processes {1, 2, . . . , n} of Π.
To specify a task T , we must specify the desired input/output behavior of processes under each possible failure pattern. We can do so by giving a set T S of tuples of the form (F, I , O): intuitively, (F, I , O) ∈ T S if and only if, when the failure pattern is F and the processes input is I , the processes output O is acceptable, i.e., it "satisfies" task T . This definition of a task is a generalization of the ones given in [2, 14, 16] which are based solely on the input/output requirement in failure-free runs. This generalization allows us to capture tasks where the desired input/output behavior depends on the failure pattern. For example, in the Atomic Commit task, if all processes vote COMMIT (this is the input), then processes are allowed to output ABORT if and only if a failure occurs.
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In summary, a task T is specified by giving (1) the sets I p and O p of possible input and output values of each process p ∈ Π, and (2) a set T S of tuples of the form (F, I , O), where F ∈ E * , I ∈ I = I 1 × I 2 × · · · × I n , and
1. (T is well-defined) For every possible failure pattern and every possible input, there is at least one output that satisfies T :
∀F ∈ E * , ∀I ∈ I, ∃O ∈ O : (F, I , O) ∈ T S 2. (T terminates) Every correct process outputs some value:
In this paper, we consider only tasks where each process p ∈ Π has a finite set of possible inputs I p . 2.10 Solving an input/output task. Let T be a task defined by some sets I p and O p (for each process p), and T S . Let A be an algorithm, D a failure detector, and E an environment. We say that:
• A run R = (F, H, I , S, T ) of A using D in E satisfies T if and only if either I ∈ I 1 × I 2 × · · · × I n , or (F, I , O) ∈ T S , where F , I and O are the failure pattern, the input and the output of run R, respectively.
• A solves T using D in E if and only if every run R of A using D in E satisfies T .
• D can be used to solve T in E if and only if there is an algorithm that solves T using D in E.
Local versus non-local tasks.
To classify a task as being local or non-local we consider its input/output requirement in the simple case of systems with no failures. Intuitively, we say that a task T is local if, in a system with no failures, each process can determine its output value based only on its input value.
More precisely, let T be a task specified by some sets I p and O p of possible input and output values for each process p, and a set T S . We say that T is local if and only if there are functions f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n such that for each possible input I = (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n ) ∈ I 1 × I 2 × · · · × I n of T , the output O = (f 1 (i 1 ), f 2 (i 2 ), . . . , f n (i n )) satisfies the specification of T when all the processes are correct, i.e., (F f f , I , O) ∈ T S . Note that for each process p, the output f p (i p ) of p depends only on the input i p of p, and so p can compute its own output locally. We say that T is non-local if and only if T is not local. For each run R of T D→D , let H out be the history of all the out-D variables in R; i.e., H out (p, t) is the value of out-D p at time t in R. Algorithm T D→D transforms D to D in environment E if and only if for every run R of T D→D using D in E, H out ∈ D (F ). We say that:
• D is weaker than D in E, if there is an algorithm T D→D that transforms D to D in E.
• D is necessary to solve a task T in E, if, for every failure detector D that can be used to solve T in E, D is weaker than D in E.
• D is necessary to solve non-local tasks in E if, for every non-local task T , D is necessary to solve T in E.
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3 The FS * failure detector
The failure detector FS * outputs GREEN or RED at each process. If all processes are correct, then FS * outputs GREEN forever at some process. If exactly one process is correct, then there is a time after which FS * outputs RED at this process. (Note that since we consider systems with at least n ≥ 2 processes, these two preconditions are mutually exclusive.) Formally, for every failure pattern F ∈ E * :
We observe that FS * is non-trivial in the sense that it cannot be implemented "from scratch" in an asynchronous system where each process may crash at any time. Formally, we say that an algorithm implements FS * in E * , if it transforms the trivial failure detector D ⊥ into FS * in environment E * . The following observation is obvious; its proof is in the optional Appendix A.
Observation 1 No algorithm implements FS
* in E * .
FS * is necessary to solve non-local tasks
We now show that for every non-local task T , FS * is necessary to solve T . We start with the following lemma that relates the ability to solve a task without exchanging messages to the definition of task locality given in Section 2.
Lemma 2 Let T be any task and E be any environment that contains the failure-free failure pattern F f f . Suppose that there is an algorithm A, a failure detector D, and a failure detector history H ∈ D(F f f ) such that:
1. A solves T using D in E, and 2. for every input I ∈ I = I 1 × I 2 × · · · × I n , there is a run R I = (F f f , H, I , S, T ) of A using D in E such that every process outputs a value before receiving any message.
Then T is a local task.
PROOF. Let T be any task, and let I p and O p be the corresponding sets of possible input and output values for each process p, and T S be the corresponding set of acceptable (F, I , O) tuples. Let E be any environment that contains F f f . Suppose that there is an algorithm A, a failure detector D, and a failure detector history H ∈ D(F f f ), that satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of the lemma. In the proof below, we fix
We now show that task T is local by first defining a function f p : I p → O p for every process p ∈ Π, and then showing that these functions give correct outputs. For each process p ∈ Π, and every possible input z ∈ I p of p, we start by defining a run R z p of A, which in turn defines the value of f p (z). To define R z p and f p (z), let I z p ∈ I be the input of T that is identical to I except that the input of process p is z; more precisely, I z p (p) = z and, for all q = p, I z p (q) = I (q). By our assumptions (1) and (2) on A, D, and
such that every process outputs a value before receiving any message. We define f p (z) to be the output of process p in run R z p , 3 and t z p to be the time when this output occurs in run R z p .
To prove that T is a local task, it now suffices to show that for every input
To show this, we construct a run R = (F f f , H, I , S, T ) of A such that, in the sequence of steps S and the corresponding times T , each process p ∈ Π takes exactly the same sequence of steps at the same times as in the run R 4 Note that for every process p ∈ Π, runs R and R xp p are indistinguishable up to time t xp p ; this is because in both runs: (a) process p has the same input, namely x p , (b) process p receives no messages up to time t xp p , (c) the failure dectector history H is the same, and (d) process p takes the same sequence of steps, at the same times, up to time t xp p . Thus, in run R, every process p ∈ Π outputs at time t xp p the same value that it outputs in run R xp p , which is, by definition,
Since R is a run of A using D in E, and A solves T using D in E, we have (F f f , I , O) ∈ T S , as we wanted to show.
Theorem 3 For every environment E, failure detector FS
* is necessary to solve non-local tasks in E.
PROOF. Let E be any environment. We must show that for every non-local task T , if a failure detector D can be used to solve T in E, then FS * is weaker than D in E, i.e., there is an algorithm that transforms D to FS * in E.
Let T be any non-local task, D be any failure detector that can be used to solve T in E, and A be any algorithm that solves T using D in E. We now describe an algorithm T D→F S * that uses A and D to transform D to FS * in E. In the following,
kp p } is the set of possible input values of process p in task T (recall that we consider only tasks with a finite number of inputs).
The transformation algorithm T D→F S * , shown in Figure 1 , emulates the output of FS * as follows. Each process p ∈ Π has a local variable out-FS * p that represents the output of the failure detector module FS * p of FS * . This variable is initialized to GREEN at every process p ∈ Π. In T D→F S * , every process p ∈ Π concurrently executes several independent instances of the algorithm A (these executions proceed in a round-robin way to ensure the progress of every execution). More precisely, for each input i p ∈ I p , process p emulates an execution of the local code A p of the algorithm A with input i p , using the given failure detector D. In each emulated execution, process p faithfully follows the "code" of A p , except that when a message is received, p discards the message and continues this execution of A p as if no message was actually received. Note that by doing so, it is possible that in some (or all) of these emulated executions of A p , process p never outputs a value for task T . If every emulated execution of A p by process p actually outputs some value, then process p sets its local variable out-FS * p to RED; thereafter out-FS * p = RED forever.
CLAIM: The algorithm in Figure 1 transforms D to FS * in environment E.
PROOF: Consider an arbitrary run R of algorithm T D→F S * using D in E. Let F ∈ E be the failure pattern of R and H ∈ D(F ) be the failure detector history of R. We must show that, in run R, the local variables out-FS * p , which are maintained by T D→F S * , emulate the output of failure detector FS * ; i.e., their values satisfy the two properties of FS * stated in Section 3: (1) if exactly one process is correct in R, say it is process p, then there is a time after which FS * p = RED, and (2) if all processes are correct in R then, at some process q, we have FS * q = GREEN forever. So we only need to consider the following two cases. Case 1: |correct(F )| = 1, i.e., there is exactly one correct process in run R. Let p be this correct process and i p ∈ I p be any input of p. Consider the run of A p with input i p that is emulated by process p in run R of T D→F S * . To process p, this emulated run is indistinguishable from a run R = (F, H, I , S , T ) 4 After time t xp p , the steps of process p in run R may diverge from those it takes in run R xp p ; in particular, after time t xp p in R, p receives all the messages that were previously sent to it in run R, not those that were sent in run R then outputs ← outputs + 1 (2) p is the only correct process in R , and (3) all the other processes take no steps before they crash in R (that's why p never receives any message in this run). Since A solves T in E, by the termination requirement of tasks (namely, that each correct process must output a value), p eventually outputs a value in this emulated run of A p with input i p . Thus, each of the k p runs of A p (one run for each possible input i p ∈ I p ) that p emulates in run R eventually outputs some value. So eventually p exits the while loop of line 1, it sets its local variable out-FS * p to RED in line 6, and thereafter out-FS * p = RED. Case 2: |correct(F )| = n, i.e., F = F f f and all processes are correct in run R. We must show that there is some process q such that out-FS * q = GREEN, forever. Suppose, for contradiction, that this does not hold. Then, it must be that every process p ∈ Π eventually reaches line 6 and sets out-FS * p to RED in run R. So, for every process p ∈ Π and every input i p ∈ I p , the execution of A p with input i p that p emulates in run R eventually outputs some value (even though p never receives any message in this emulation). Let t out be the time the last such output occurs (across all processes and all inputs) in run R.
Consider any input vector I = (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n ) ∈ I = I 1 × I 2 × · · · × I n of task T . We now show that there is a run R I = (F f f , H, I , S , T ) of A using D in E such that every process outputs a value before receiving any messages. We construct run R I = (F f f , H, I , S , T ) of A using, for each process p, the emulated execution of A p with input i p in run R, as follows. In run R I , for every process p ∈ Π: (1) up to time t out , p takes the same steps at the same times as in the emulated execution of A p with input i p in run R (in these steps p does not receive any message and it outputs some value), and (2) after time t out , p continues its execution of A p with input i p , but now p starts receiving every message sent to it by every other process q ∈ Π in its execution of A q with input i q (including messages that were discarded by p in its emulation of A p with input i p in run R). In other words, run R I = (F f f , H, I , S , T ) of A is built as follows: (1) up to time t out , R I is the merging of the n independent executions of A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n with the local inputs i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n , emulated by processes 1, 2, . . . , n, respectively, in run R (in these emulated executions no messages are received -it is as if all messages are delayed to after time t out -and every process outputs some value by time t out ); and (2) after time t out , in R I processes 1, 2, . . . , n continue their executions of A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n with local inputs i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n , respectively, such that they eventually receive every message that are sent to them in these executions, including all those sent before time t out .
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Note that R I = (F f f , H, I , S , T ) is a run of A using D in E. Moreover, in run R I every process outputs a value by time t out , before receiving any message. Since I is an arbitrary input in I, it is now clear that A, D and H ∈ D(F f f ) satisfy both conditions (1) and (2) of Lemma 2. Note also that E includes F f f . So, by Lemma 2, T is a local task -a contradiction. We conclude that there is some process q such that out-FS * q = GREEN, forever. Case 1 and Case 2 show that the local variables out-FS * emulate the output of failure detector FS * correctly, as we needed to show.
Weak set agreement
Weak set agreement (WSA) is a weaker version of the well-known set agreement task [5] : the condition that there are at most n − 1 distinct decision values is required only for failure-free runs. More precisely, each process can propose any value in V = {1, 2, . . . , n} and must decide some value such that:
• TERMINATION: Every correct process eventually decides some value.
• VALIDITY: Each decided value was proposed by some process.
• WEAK AGREEMENT: If all processes are correct then there are at most n − 1 distinct decision values.
It is clear that WSA can be formally defined as an input/output task. The proof of the following theorem is in the optional Appendix B.
Theorem 4 WSA is a non-local task.
Corollary 5 For every environment E, FS
* is necessary to solve WSA in E.
PROOF. This is an immediate consequence of Theorems 3 and 4.
6 Solving weak set agreement using FS * We now prove that FS * can be used to solve the weak set agreement task, and in fact it is the weakest failure detector to solve this task; intuitively, this means that FS * is necessary and sufficient for this task [3] . More precisely: A failure detector D is the weakest failure detector to solve a task T in E iff: 5 • NECESSITY: D is necessary to solve T in E, and
• SUFFICIENCY: D can be used to solve T in E.
The algorithm in Figure 2 solves the weak set agreement task using FS * . It is identical to the one that solves the set agreement task using L given in [8] . In this algorithm, lines 3-5 and lines 6-8 are executed atomically. The proof of correctness is in the optional Appendix C.
Theorem 6 For every environment E, the algorithm in Figure 2 solves WSA using FS * in E. 
Corollary 7 For every environment E, FS
* is the weakest failure detector to solve WSA in E.
PROOF. This is an immediate consequence of Corollary 5 and Theorem 6.
We conclude that WSA is the weakest non-local task in message-passing systems in the following sense:
Corollary 8 For every environment E, any non-local task T , and any failure detector D, if D can be used to solve T in E, then D can also be used to solve WSA in E.
PROOF (SKETCH)
. Since D can be used to solve T in E, by Theorem 3, FS * is weaker than D in E. So processes can use D to emulate FS * in E, and then they can use this emulated FS * to solve WSA with the algorithm in Figure 2 .
FS
* is the minimum failure detector for non-local tasks
We now show that FS * is the strongest failure detector necessary to solve non-local tasks.
Theorem 9 Let E be any environment.
(NECESSITY:) FS
(MAXIMALITY:)
Every failure detector D that is necessary to solve non-local tasks in E is weaker than FS * in E.
PROOF. Part (1) was already shown in Theorem 3. We now prove Part (2) . Let E be any environment. Let D be any failure detector that is necessary to solve non-local tasks in E, i.e.: (*) for any non-local task T , if a failure detector D can be used to solve T in E then D is weaker than D in E. We must show that D is weaker than FS * in E. Consider the WSA task. By Theorem 4, WSA is a non-local task. By Theorem 6, FS * can be used to solve WSA in E. By "plugging in" T = WSA and D = FS * in (*), we get that D is weaker than FS * in E.
Task locality and solving a task without messages
In this section, we establish the equivalence of two alternate definitions of task locality: the one given in Section 2, based on the existence of "local" functions that processes can apply to obtain a correct output, and another one based on the ability to solve a task without messages. We prove this equivalence under a natural assumption on tasks, which, roughly speaking, says that the output of processes is not constrained by failures that may happen in the future. We first explain this assumption in Section ??, and then prove the equivalence of the two alternate definitions of locality in Section ??.
Omission-closed tasks
We now define a property that, to the best of our knowledge, is satisfied by all the one-shot input/output tasks that have been proposed and studied to date, including those defined in [2, 14, 16] . Roughly speaking, a task T is omission-closed if any input/output behavior that satisfies T when all processes are correct, can be modified into a input/output behavior that also satisfies T when some processes are faulty, by simply allowing any subset of the faulty processes to omit their output. In other words, if, for the input vector I , the output vector O satisfies T when there are no failures, then, when there are failures, T is also satisfied by any output vector O that differs from O only in that some faulty processes may have the "empty" output ⊥ in O . Formally, task T is omission-closed, if and only if, for all inputs I ∈ I = I 1 × I 2 × · · · × I n and all
This property is quite natural: intuitively, it says that the output requirement of processes is not constrained by failures that may occur in the future. To illustrate this, suppose all processes are alive and execute correctly up to a time when they are just about to output some values, and these values satisfy the task in the failure-free case; but immediately after this time, some processes crash just before outputing, while the other processes output as planned. If the task is omission-closed, these outputs also satisfy the task.
Equivalence of two notions of locality
An alternate definition of task locality is based on the ability to solve a task without messages. Roughly speaking, we could say that a task is local if it can be solved by an algorithm A and a failure detector D such that in all the failure-free runs of A using D every process outputs a value before receiving any message. For omission-closed tasks, this definition of locality is equivalent to the one that we gave in Section 2 using local functions:
Theorem 15 Let T be any omission-closed task, and E be any environment that contains the failure-free failure pattern F f f . T is a local task if and only if there is an algorithm A and a failure detector D such that:
1. A solves T using D in E, and 2. for every failure detector history H ∈ D(F f f ), every input I ∈ I 1 × I 2 × · · · × I n , and every run R I = (F f f , H, I , −, −) of A using D in E, every process outputs a value before receiving any message.
PROOF. Let T be any omission-closed task, and let I p and O p be the corresponding sets of possible input and output values for each process p, and T S be the corresponding set of acceptable (F, I , O) tuples. Let E be any environment that contains F f f .
Suppose task T is local. Then there are functions f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n such that for each possible input I = (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n ) ∈ I 1 × I 2 × · · · × I n of T , the output O = (f 1 (i 1 ), f 2 (i 2 ), . . . , f n (i n )) satisfies the specification of T when all the processes are correct, i.e., (F f f , I , O) ∈ T S . Consider the following trivial algorithm A (which does not require the help of failure detectors): for any local input i p ∈ I p , each process p outputs f p (i p ). From the properties of the functions f p 's above, and the assumption that T is omission-closed, it is clear that A solves T in E (using any trivial failure detector D). To see this, note that
. So A and any trivial failure detector D satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of Theorem ??. Now suppose there exists an algorithm A and a failure detector D that satisfies conditions (1) and (2) of Theorem ??. Let H be any failure detector history in D(F f f ). Conditions (1) and (2) of Theorem ?? trivially imply conditions (1) and (2) of Lemma 2. So by Lemma 2, task T is local.
Comparing FS
* to anti-Ω and L in message-passing systems
The following theorem compares FS * to two closely related failure detectors, namely, L and anti-Ω, which are the weakest failure detectors to solve set agreement in message-passing and shared memory systems, respectively. Intuitively, failure detector L outputs GREEN or RED at each process such that (1) it outputs GREEN forever at some process, and (2) if exactly one process is correct, then there is a time after which L outputs RED at this process. Anti-Ω outputs a process id at each process such that, if there is a correct process, then there is a correct process c and a time after which anti-Ω never outputs c at any correct process. The proof of the following result is in the optional Appendix D.
Theorem 16 Anti-Ω is strictly weaker than FS
* in E * , and FS * is strictly weaker than L in E * . 6 
Related Work
Failure detectors have been used to capture the minimum information about failures that is necessary to solve some basic problems in message-passing and shared-memory systems (e.g., [4, 3, 1, 13, 6, 7, 11, 18, 8] ). Recently, failure detectors were also used to investigate the minimum information about failures that is necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) to solve some interesting sets of problems.
In particular, Guerraoui et al. consider the set of wait-free tasks S wf that cannot be solved in asynchronous shared-memory systems with failures [10] . They introduce a failure detector denoted Υ and prove that (1) among the set of "eventually stable failure detectors", Υ is necessary to solve any task in S wf , and (2) Υ is sufficient to solve set agreement. Zielinski generalizes this result in [18] : he introduces the failure detector anti-Ω and proves that (1) anti-Ω is necessary to solve any task in S wf , and (2) anti-Ω is the weakest failure detector to solve set agreement. In contrast to the results in [10, 18] which are in shared-memory systems, in [17] Zielinsky considers message-passing systems, and proves that anti-Ω is the weakest failure detector among the set of eventual failure detectors that are not implementable in such systems.
Delporte et al. also consider message-passing systems in [8] : they introduce failure detector L and show that it is the weakest failure detector to solve set agreement in such systems. The failure detector FS * introduced here is a simple weakening of L.
Our definition of weak set agreement was obtained by taking a well-known problem, namely set agreement, and weakening one of its property in the case of failures. This method of weakening a task was already proposed in the early 80's to obtain weaker versions of some classical problems such as consensus and reliable broadcast [9, 12] . For example, the validity property of consensus (which requires that any decision 6 We say that D is strictly weaker than
is the environment where any process can fail at any time).
hal-00401844, version 1 -6 Jul 2009
value must be a proposed value) can be weakened to "if there are no failures, then the validity property must hold" (this property is called weak unanimity in [9] ). The specification of such tasks can be captured by our definition of a task because it includes the failure pattern (to the best of our knowledge, such definition of a task first appeared in [15] ). This is a generalization of the definitions of a task given in [2, 14, 16] which are based solely on the input/output requirement in failure-free runs.
Optional Appendix
A FS * is non-trivial
PROOF. (Sketch) Suppose, for contradiction, that there is an algorithm A that implements FS * in E * . We now show that A has a run R that violates the specification of FS * .
Let R p be a run of A such that (1) process p is the only correct process in R p , and (2) no other process takes any step in R p . Since A satisfies the specification of FS * , there is a time t p after which p outputs RED in R p , forever. We now construct a run R of A where all processes are correct, but all the messages are delayed to a time t > max p∈Π {t p }. For each process p, R is indistinguishable from run R p up to time t p , and so p outputs RED at time t p in run R. After time t, we continue run R as follows: all the messages sent, including those that were previously delayed, are eventually received. Note that run R is a valid run of A where (1) all processes are correct, but (2) every process p ∈ Π outputs RED at least once. Run R of A violates the specification of FS * .
B Weak set agreement is a non-local task
PROOF. The proof is simple. Suppose, for contradiction, that WSA is local. Since WSA is local, there are functions f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n such that for each possible input I = (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n ) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} n , the output
) satisfies the specification of WSA when all processes are correct, i.e.,
Consider input I = (1, 2, . . . , n), i.e., every process i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, proposes value i. Let O = (f 1 (1), f 2 (2), . . . , f n (n)); this is the output where every process i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, decides value f i (i). The output O must satisfy the specification of WSA when all processes are correct, i.e, (F f f , I , O) ∈ WSA S . Thus, by the validity property of WSA, for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, f i (i) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Furthermore, by the weak agreement property of WSA, there must be a j and a k such that f j (j) = k = j.
Let I = (j, j, . . . , j), i.e., every process proposes j. The output O = (f 1 (j), f 2 (j), . . . , f j (j), . . . f n (j)) must satisfy the specification of WSA when all processes are correct, i.e, (F f f , I , O ) ∈ WSA S . But process j outputs (i.e., decides) f j (j) = k, a value that was not proposed by any process. This violates the validity property of WSA, so (F f f , I , O ) ∈ WSA S -a contradiction that concludes the proof.
C FS
* solves the weak set agreement task
The algorithm in Figure 2 solves the weak set agreement task using FS * . It is identical to the one that solves the set agreement task using L given in [8] . In this algorithm, lines 3-5 and lines 6-8 are executed atomically. The proof of correctness is given in the optional Appendix.
Theorem 6 For every environment E, the algorithm in Figure 2 solves WSA using FS * in E.
PROOF. Consider an arbitrary run R of the algorithm using FS * in some environment E, and let F be the failure pattern of R (so, when we say "p is correct", we mean p ∈ correct(F )). We show that run R satisfies the three properties of WSA.
Validity. This property holds because each process decides on its own proposal value (line 8), or a proposal value sent by another process (line 5). Termination. There are two possible cases:
(1) There is exactly one correct process p in run R. Then, by the specification of FS * , there a time after which the failure detector module FS * p outputs RED at p. So either p decides in line 5, or it decides according to lines 6-8.
(2) There are at least two correct processes in run R. Let p and q be two correct processes such that q > p. Note that p sends v p to q in line 2. So either q decides in line 8, or it decides according to lines 3-5. Therefore q sends its decision value to all processes in line 4 or in line 7. So every correct process that is still undecided receives this value in line 3 and decides in line 5.
Thus, in both cases, all correct processes decide.
Weak agreement. If processes propose at most n − 1 different values in R, then by the validity property (shown above), there are at most n − 1 different decision values, and so weak agreement holds. So assume that there are n distinct proposed values in R, and let v p denote the value proposed by process p in R.
Note that if there is a process that is not correct in R, or there is a process that never decides in R, then the weak agreement property is trivially satisfied in R. Henceforth, we assume that all the processes are correct and they all decide in run R.
Since all processes are correct in R, there is a process r such that the failure detector module FS * r never outputs RED at r. Thus r does not decide in line 8, and so it decides in line 5. Let p be the process with the largest id that decides in line 5. So every process q > p decides in line 8.
We claim that no process decides v p . To see this, note that:
(1) No process q > p decides v p . This is because each process q > p decides in line 8, and so it decides v q = v p .
(2) No process q > p sends v p . This follows from (1).
(3) No process s ≤ p receives v p . This follows from the fact that p initially sends v p only to processes q > p, and, by (2), these processes do not relay v p to any process. So v p is not sent to any process s ≤ p.
(4) Process p does not decide v p . This is because p decides in line 5 the value that it received in line 3, and, by (3), it does not receive v p .
CODE FOR PROCESS p
Local Variables: In this section we compare FS * to anti-Ω and L. We say that:
• D is strictly weaker than D in E, if D is weaker than D but D is not weaker than D in E.
D.1 Anti-Ω is strictly weaker than FS *
The failure detector anti-Ω [18] outputs a process id at every process. If there is at least one correct process, then there is a correct process c and a time after which anti-Ω does not output c at any correct process. Formally, for every failure pattern F ∈ E * :
a correct process q such that FS * outputs GREEN at q forever. So q is never added to RedSet q , and this implies that q ∈ X -a contradiction to the assumption that X = Π.
Note that faulty processes eventually stop increasing their heartbeats while correct processes keep increasing them forever. Thus, from the way processes maintain their heartbeat arrays, it is clear that there is a time after which for every correct process p, every faulty process f and every correct process c,
Since X = Π, there is a time after which every correct process p has out-anti-Ω p = q, where q is the process with the smallest (heartbeat p [q], q); from the above, it is clear that there is a time after which q is faulty. So, since there is at least one correct process in run R, there is a correct process c and a time after which every correct process p has out-anti-Ω p = c.
Thus, in both cases, the variables out-anti-Ω correctly emulate the output of anti-Ω.
Lemma 12 FS
* is not weaker than anti-Ω in E * .
PROOF. (Sketch) Suppose, for contradiction, that there is an algorithm T anti-Ω→F S * that transforms anti-Ω to FS * in E * . We now show that this algorithm is not correct, i.e., it has a run R in E * that does not emulate the output of FS * correctly.
For every p ∈ Π, let R p be a run of T anti-Ω→F S * in E * such that (1) process p is the only correct process in R p , and (2) no other process takes any step in R p , and (3) at all processes, anti-Ω outputs the smallest process in the set Π − {p} (note that this output satisfies the specification of anti-Ω since process p is correct in run R p ). Since T anti-Ω→F S * emulates the output of FS * , there is a time t p after which p outputs RED in R p , i.e., out-FS * p = RED. We now construct the "bad" run R of T anti-Ω→F S * in E * as follows. In run R, (1) all processes are correct, (2) all the messages are delayed to a time t > max p∈Π {t p }, (3) each process p takes steps at the same times as in run R p , and (4) at each process p, anti-Ω outputs the smallest process in the set Π − {p}. For every process p, run R is indistinguishable from run R p up to time t p , and so p has out-FS * p = RED at time t p in run R.
To ensure that R is a valid run of T anti-Ω→F S * in E * , we continue run R from time t as follows: (1) all the messages sent, including those that were previously delayed, are eventually received, and (2) anti-Ω outputs process 1 at all processes (note that this output satisfies the specification of anti-Ω because all the processes are correct in R). Thus, R is a valid run of T anti-Ω→F S * in E * where (1) all processes are correct, but (2) every process p ∈ Π has out-FS * p = RED at least once. Note that this emulated output of FS * does not satisfy the specification of FS * -a contradiction that concludes the proof.
D.2 FS * is strictly weaker than L
The failure detector L [8] outputs RED and GREEN at each process, such that: (a) FS * outputs GREEN forever at some process, and (b) if exactly one process is correct, then there is a time after which FS * outputs RED at this process. 7 Formally, for every failure pattern F ∈ E * : L(F) = H | (∀p ∈ Π, ∀t ∈ N : H(p, t) = GREEN ∨ H(p, t) = RED) ∧ (∃p ∈ Π, ∀t ∈ N : H(p, t) = GREEN) ∧ (|correct(F )| = 1 ⇒ ∃p ∈ correct(F ), ∃t ∈ N, ∀t ≥ t : H(p, t ) = RED)
Lemma 13 For every environment E, FS
* is weaker than L in E.
PROOF. This is obvious from the definitions of L and FS * : for every failure pattern F ∈ E, L(F) ⊆ FS * (F ).
Lemma 14 L is not weaker than FS * in E * .
PROOF. (Sketch) Suppose, for contradiction, that there is an algorithm T F S * →L that transforms FS * to L in E * . We now show that this algorithm is not correct, i.e., it has a run R in E * that does not emulate the output of L correctly.
For every p ∈ Π, let R p be a run of T F S * →L in E * such that (1) process p is the only correct process in R p , and (2) no other process takes any step in R p , and (3) FS * p always outputs RED at p (note that this output satisfies the specification of FS * since process p is the only correct in run R p ). Since T F S * →L emulates the output of L, there is a time t p after which p outputs RED in R p , i.e., out-L p = RED.
We now construct the "bad" run R of T F S * →L in E * as follows. In run R, (1) all processes are correct except for process 1 which crashes at time max p∈Π {t p }+1, (2) all the messages are delayed to a time t > max p∈Π {t p }, (3) up to time t p , each process p takes steps at the same times as in run R p , and (4) FS * outputs RED forever at every process (note that this output satisfies the specification of FS * since not all processes are correct in run R). For every process p, run R is indistinguishable from run R p up to time t p , and so p has out-L p = RED at time t p in run R.
To ensure that R is a valid run of T F S * →L in E * , we continue run R from time t as follows: all the messages sent to correct processes, including those that were previously delayed, are eventually received. Thus, R is a valid run of T F S * →L in E * where (1) all processes except process 1 are correct, but (2) every process p ∈ Π has out-L p = RED at least once. Note that this emulated output of L does not satisfy the specification of L -a contradiction that concludes the proof.
D.3 Comparing FS
* to anti-Ω and L
We can now conclude:
Theorem 10 Anti-Ω is strictly weaker than FS * in E * , and FS * is strictly weaker than L in E * .
PROOF. From Lemmas 11 and 12, we get that anti-Ω is strictly weaker than FS * in E * . From Lemmas 13 and 14, we get that FS * is strictly weaker than L in E * .
